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Introduction 
Maximum Residue Limits (MRLs) are widely used to regulate the application of pesticides in 
plant products and veterinary drugs in animal products. For example, the United States sets 10 
parts per billion (ppb) as the maximum allowable level for the use of O-phenylphenol pesticide 
on lemon trees (USDA). While lower tolerance levels reduce the health and environmental 
hazards, the associated compliance costs borne by growers, both at home and abroad, can 
significantly affect the relevant industry. As import tariffs are progressively constrained by 
multilateral agreements under the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a myriad of regional 
trade agreements, more attention is being given to various forms of non-tariff measures (NTMs) 
and barriers (NTBs), including MRLs, which may constitute new protectionism. Such trend is 
evidenced by the growing number of WTO trade disputes and concerns citing the sanitary and 
phytosanitary (SPS) agreement and the Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement (e.g., 
DS430, DS406, and DS389; see Disdier and van Tongeren (2010) for SPS concerns). The two 
WTO agreements allow member countries to set their own standards but require that the 
regulations should be science-based, non-discriminative (applicable to similar products of all 
origins) and least trade distorting.  
To minimize the possible trade distortion implied by food safety standards, WTO 
agreements recommend using science-based international standards whenever possible. The 
Codex Alimentarius committee, established by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations and the World Health Organization, has been developing such international 
standards and practice codes based on currently available science. Nevertheless, Codex standards 
are voluntary in nature and only a fraction of member countries have fully deferred their MRLs 
to Codex levels as of March 2012 (Li and Beghin, 2012).   
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One may speculate that a food safety standard that is more stringent than its Codex 
counterpart is more likely to distort trade, and thus warrants further scrutiny. Several conceptual 
models in the literature have addressed such protectionist suspicion on the stringency of a 
standard addressing a market imperfection. Fisher and Serra (2000) showed that a social planner 
maximizing domestic welfare sets standards that are too stringent from the viewpoint of a global 
social planner maximizing global welfare (domestic welfare and foreign firms’ profit). More 
recently, Marette and Beghin (2010) further point out that a policy-maker would adopt 
excessively stringent standards to correct externalities when its domestic producers have a 
comparative advantage in complying with the regulations but would do the opposite if their 
producers are much less efficient than foreign competitors in meeting the standards. Swinnen and 
Vandemoortele (2011) underscore the political considerations in the design of food standards. 
Berti and Falvey (2011) looked at the interface between trade and stringency of standards in a 
political economy model à la Grossman and Helpman. However, empirical studies assessing the 
trade effects of excessive standards are lacking, possibly due to the following two obstacles.1 
First, it is difficult to measure the stringency of standards because of the complexity and 
vagueness in legislative documents, commodity classifications, regulatory procedures, and other 
logistic reasons.2 Second, globally optimal standards (which presumably maximize the sum of 
consumers’ welfare, domestic producers’ welfare, and foreign producers’ welfare net of external 
effects) are unknown and hard to estimate. The latter problem means that it is difficult to 
distinguish a standard with legitimate public objectives from one driven by protectionism, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  Related to the issue of excessive stringency, Czubala, Shepherd, and Wilson (2009) show that harmonized 
standards are less trade-impeding or even trade-promoting in textile and clothing sectors. Winchester et al. (2012) 
measure the relative stringency of non-tariff measures between bilateral trading partners and their impact on trade. 
2	  The World Trade Report 2012 (WTO) acknowledges those inefficiencies and identifies WTO’s role in promoting 
transparency and conformity in the regulation of non-tariff measures. 
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especially in presence of external effects. The standard itself is not in question, but its optimal 
level is. When it comes to empirical analysis, the first hurdle challenges the quantification of 
standards in general, and the second one hinders the measurement of their excessiveness. In the 
context of MRLs on pesticides and veterinary drugs in plant and animal products, however, the 
above problems are less hindering because MRLs are quantitative in nature, and Codex MRLs 
constitute science-based international standards that are presumably “not far” from globally 
optimal standards, at least as far as science is concerned. Our premise and that of Li and Beghin 
(2012) are that systematic deviations from international standards is an indication of excessive 
stringency in a WTO sense as it contradicts the WTO’s prescription of adopting such 
international standards. Our investigation explores the trade effects of departures from these 
MRL international standards on trade patterns in plant and animal products for the US and 
Canada.  
 It has been gradually recognized that the implication of food safety regulations on 
international trade goes beyond mere protectionism of a domestic industry. First, a quality-like 
standard does not necessarily hurt imports. Unlike traditional trade measures (such as import 
tariffs and quotas) that simply tax foreign producers, many food safety standards also address 
information asymmetry or consumption externalities, potentially leading to an enhanced demand 
for imports and trade. For instance, Jaffee and Henson (2005) showed that Kenyan fresh 
vegetable growers were able to expand their exports to EU after successfully upgrading the 
supply chain and meeting EU’ sanitary standards. Xiong and Beghin (2012) show that intra-
OECD agricultural trade is facilitated by technical measures because the regulations enhance the 
import demand more than they penalize foreign suppliers meeting this import demand, through 
higher costs. 
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By symmetry of the latter argument, not only food safety standards affect a country’s 
inward trade flows (imports), but also its own competitiveness and outward trade flows (exports). 
According to the SPS and TBT agreements, both foreign and domestic producers ought to 
comply with the food safety standards and other technical measures. A priori, the own-export 
effect of a domestic standard can be either positive or negative, depending on whether the 
domestic industry has a comparative advantage in meeting the regulations, and how consumers 
in destination markets perceive the enhanced safety or quality. For example, Blind and 
Jungmittag (2005) identified the trade-fostering effect of international standards in the case of 
trade between Germany and United Kingdom. More recently, Blind, Mangelsdorf, and Wilson 
(2012) find that countries’ certification with ISO standards tends to expand their own exports. 
Several other investigations have also looked at heterogeneity in food safety standards across 
countries and how this heterogeneity affects bilateral trade (e.g. .Winchester et al. (2012), 
Drogué and DeMaria (2012)). 
We empirically examine the implications of stringency of MRLs in pesticides and 
veterinary drugs for the trade performance of the US and Canada. The case of the US and 
Canada is of particular interest given the fact that the two countries’ economies are deeply 
integrated, but have been keeping and implementing different MRL policies. Our investigation 
uses the protectionist score indices developed by Beghin and Li (2012) (discussed in more detail 
below) to measure the restrictiveness of MRLs relative to the Codex levels, which are science-
based international standards. Using a gravity equation approach to trade, we investigate the 
impacts of the score indices on the trade performance of the US and Canada in plant and animal 
products. We find that, U.S. MRLs, which are no systematically stricter than Codex, do not 
significantly impede its imports from the rest of the world, but that U.S. exports are constrained 
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by MRL regulations abroad. As a country using stricter-than-Codex tolerance levels in many 
plant and animal products, Canada has gained further competitiveness in the world market, 
without systematically driving foreign competitors out of its own market because of its stringent 
MRLs. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the data and the 
empirical methodology. Section 3 presents the regression results and economic interpretations. 
Conclusions and policy implications on harmonization are drawn in Section 4. 
 
Data and methodology 
Data and the scores of excessive MRLs 
The global MRL database developed by USDA compiles MRLs on pesticides in plant products 
and veterinary drugs in animal products for a large set of countries. These MRLs are presented 
by pesticide type (or drug type), by commodity, and by country, including the international 
Codex MRL whenever defined (USDA). Overall, the database covers MRLs set by 83 individual 
countries as well as Codex, in 345 pesticides and 87 veterinary drugs, for 340 plant and animal 
products.3  
To measure the excessiveness of a country’s MRLs applied to a given product, Beghin 
and Li (2012) define the following score index: 
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3	  The database is limited in a few aspects, such as the omission of pesticides and veterinary drugs not used in the 
United States. See Beghin and Li (2012) for a thorough discussion of the database. 
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where 
( )kjkn
MRL is maximum residue limit adopted  by Country j , for product k , and targeting 
pesticide or veterinary drug ( )kn ;  and ( ), kcodex knMRL  is the MRL recommended by Codex for the 
same product and pesticide or veterinary drug type; and ( )kN  is the total number of pesticides or 
veterinary drugs applied to product k .
 
The score index defined by Equation (1) measures the stringency (in reference to Codex) 
of a country’s MRL regulations toward a given product.4 The higher the score is, the more 
stringent the country’s MRLs are towards the product. In particular, the score reduces to one for 
a country that defers to Codex completely. A score above one indicates that, averaging over all 
applicable pesticides or veterinary drugs, the country adopts stricter-than-Codex standards to 
regulate the product of concern. 
The above MRL stringency score is appealing in several aspects as explained in Li and 
Beghin (2012). First, it is invariant to units of measurement of MRLs. As an illustration, the 
same score emerges if MRLs were measured in parts per million rather than in parts per billion. 
Second, the score is increasing and convex in MRLs set by individual countries; this assumes 
that lowering (i.e. tightening the standard) a MRL is increasingly difficult. Last, by averaging 
across all types of pesticides or veterinary drugs, the score avoids assigning higher scores to 
certain commodities simply because a greater variety of pesticides or drugs are commonly 
applied to those products. 
By virtue of the above-defined score indices, our empirical analysis focuses on the MRLs 
implemented in the US and Canada and their impacts on the trade performance of the two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4	  The score index differs from the heterogeneity index suggested by Winchester et al. (2012) in that the score index 
measures the discrepancy between domestic MRLs and Codex MRLs as opposed to the difference in MRLs between 
two trading partners.  
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countries respectively. The Canadian and U.S. cases are of particular interest for the following 
reason. From the viewpoint of a third-country exporter, The US and Canada are “close-
substitute” destination markets in terms of geography proximity, consumer preferences, and 
internal tariff structure from NAFTA. Therefore, the differential trade costs implied by MRL 
policies could play an important role in a third country’s choice of export destination. In addition, 
despite the deep integration of the U.S. and Canadian markets, the two countries have kept 
considerably different MRL policies and it is interesting to see how these differences in 
standards have influenced their own exports to the rest of the world.  
To illustrate the MRL stringency differentials between the US and Canada, we compare 
their score indices by HS chapters in Figure 1. Two interesting features are worth noting in the 
boxplot. First, Canadian average scores are higher than U.S. average scores in several sectors: 
meat products (HS-02), edible vegetables (HS-07), edible fruits and nuts (HS-08), coffee, tea and 
spices (HS-09), and cereals/grains (HS-10) in particular. Second, Canadian mean scores are well 
above one (which is the score for a country deferring  to Codex) in several sectors, while U.S. 
mean scores are fairly close to one in almost all sectors.  
To complement the score indices with bilateral trade records, we extract trade series in 
plant and animal products in the year 2010 from the database COMTRADE-United Nations. We 
focus on the cross-section for 2010 because the global MRL database is frequently updated and 
without archives, which means that the MRL data can be only mapped with recent trade flows. 
The 2010 trade series are the latest complete data in COMTRADE.5 Finally, we merge the MRL 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Although the 2011 import series are available in COMTRADE, it contains many missing entries for several 
countries, for which the corresponding 2010 trade entries were not systematically missing. 
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score indices and trade series by country and by commodity.6 In summary, we have 60 countries 
trading or potentially trading with the US or Canada in 135 plant and animal products (HS-4 or 
HS-6 produce lines) classified into 9 sectors (HS-2 chapters). 
 
Figure 1: MRL score indices in selected chapters, US and Canada 
 
   Data source: Li and Beghin (2012) 
 
Empirical strategy 
The gravity equation approach is widely used to evaluate the impacts of various policies and 
trade costs on bilateral international trade flows. The gravity equation at the sectoral level is 
based on an equilibrium condition between export supply from the country where the good is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6	  COMTRADE and the global MRL database use different country names and product classifications.  We borrow 
the conversion defined in Li and Beghin (2012).  
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produced and import demands in destination countries (see de Frahan and Vancauteren (2006) 
for such specification). It explains bilateral trade flows by plausible trade determinants such as 
the income level of the importing country, the production capacity of the exporting country, and 
factors that could affect the costs of trade between countries (e.g., geographic distance, colonial 
relationship, contingency condition, official language type, and preferential trade agreements). 
For our purpose, we focus on the following two plausible trade determinants in a given sector: 
the stringency MRL scores of the importing country and the corresponding MRL scores of the 
exporting country. The estimated coefficient of the importer’s score sheds light on the impact of 
MRL stringency on the country’s imports. Presumably, a negative and statistically significant 
estimate suggests that the stringency adversely affects foreign competitors and potentially should 
be further scrutinized for possible protectionism. Equally important, we include the stringency 
MRL score of the exporting country as an additional explanatory variable of the bilateral trade 
flow to investigate the impact of a country’s own stringency standards on its export performance. 
A priori, stringent standards at home can either promote or hinder the export performance of the 
domestic industry, depending on whether domestic producers have a comparative advantage in 
complying with the regulations and to what extent the enhanced safety or improved quality is 
appreciated by consumers in destination markets. In the case of MRLs on pesticide and 
veterinary drug residues, the presumption is that such own export effect is positive as countries 
adopting stringency in excess of Codex are overwhelmingly from the developed world (Beghin 
and Li, 2012).  
 Following Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) and others, we specify the following 
gravity equation to characterize the bilateral trade in food and animal products:  
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(2) 0 1 2( ) exp{ I },ijk jk ik n n m m l l
n m l
E y score score E Sα α α φ ϕ γ= + + + + +∑ ∑ ∑  
where ijky  is country j ’s value of import of product k from country i , jkscore  is the importing 
country’s score in product k , ikscore  is the exporting country’s score in product k , In  is a 
dummy variable that equals one if country n  is the importing country, mE  is a dummy variable 
that equals one if country m  is the exporting country, and lS  is a dummy variable that equals 
one if product k belongs to sector l . The country-level dummy variables account for the 
multilateral trade resistance terms (Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), and the sector-level 
dummy variables control for the heterogeneity across sectors. Noticeably, the conventional trade 
cost terms such as distance, tariff rates, colonial tie, and free trade agreements are omitted in (2) 
because trading partners’ dummy variables fully absorb those effects when only one exporter or 
one importer is considered in each regression.  
We conduct two sets of regressions. In the first set, we run four different individual 
regressions based on (2): (i) U.S. imports from the rest of the world ( j USA=  and 1,2,...,i I= ); 
(ii) U.S. exports to the rest of the world ( 1,2,...,j J=  and i USA= ); (iii) Canadian imports from 
the rest of the world ( j CAN=  and 1,2,...,i I= ); and (iv) Canadian exports to the rest of the 
world ( 1,2,...,j J=  and i CAN= ). The number of observations in each regression is 8100 (60 
trading partners and 135 products). In the second set, we analyze the full sample with all 60 
countries as importers and exporters, and allow the US and Canada to have different MRL 
responses. Besides evaluating the impacts of MRLs on U.S. and Canadian specific trade flows, 
this approach makes possible inference on other trade costs as in a conventional gravity analysis.  
In addition, the pooling of all countries avoids the sample selection issue.  
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In the first set, the advantage of individual regressions is that the associated results are 
robust to the omission of any bilateral trade costs, whose effects are fully captured by the trading 
partners’ fixed effects. Nevertheless, the restriction to only one country (either the US or Canada) 
at a time means we lose some cross-country variation that could improve statistical inference. 
The second set of results accommodates such concerns but complicates the interpretation of 
results specific to the US and Canada. Specifically, we compile a balanced sample with all 60 
countries trading or potentially trading with one another and collect usual bilateral trade cost 
variables such as distance, colonial relationship, common language, and common border from 
CEPII. We estimate (2) again using the balanced sample while allowing the scores of the US and 
Canada to have different slopes for score indices.  
One common feature of the regressions and associated data is that zero trade records are 
prevalent. Specifically, in the first set of regression, the proportions of zeros in (i) through (iv) 
are 81 per cent, 55 per cent, 71 per cent, and 85 per cent respectively. In the second set the 
frequency of missing trade increases to 90 per cent. Accordingly in both sets of regressions, we 
estimate equation (2) via the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator (Silva and 
Tenreyro, 2006) and construct the heteroskedasticity-resistant standard errors as in White (1980). 
The PPML estimator accommodates zero outcomes (which are pervasive in our application) and 
has been shown to be robust to various heteroskedastic patterns (which are common in cross-
sectional analysis).  
A legitimate caveat in the analysis is that we abstract from the potential endogeneity of 
MRLs. Farnsworth (2012) reports that the levels of MRLs are attributable to public concerns 
about food safety, countries’ development status, but less to industry’s lobbying efforts, although 
no formal structural model is developed to rationalize these empirical findings.  In contrast, Li 
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(2012) finds that MRL stringency and tariffs are jointly determined, which suggests that political 
decision-making might have a role in the design or implementation of MRL policies. 
Results and discussions 
Beginning with the first set of regression, we first focus on the U.S. trade performance for plant 
and animal products, or cases (i) and (ii) described above. Table 1 summarizes the regression 
results when we consider U.S. imports from and export to the rest of the world. It turns out that 
U.S. MRL stringency weakly impedes its imports but facilitates its export of plant and animal 
product. Neither of the effects is statistically significant, suggesting that U.S. MRLs do not 
systematically distort trade in these products. Interestingly, U.S. exports are significantly 
constrained by its trading partners’ stringent regulations, indicating that U.S. producers face 
additional trade costs when exporting to markets where stringent standards apply. In addition, the 
estimated coefficient of the exporter’s score can go either negative (as in the regression 
explaining U.S. imports) or positive (as in the regression explaining U.S. exports), which points 
to the ambiguity of the own export effect of home standards: they can either improve or disturb 
the export performance, depending on domestic producers’ cost-effectiveness in compliance and 
the information conveyed to the destination markets. Again none of these effects is significant. 
The relatively low pseudo R-square statistics are typical for cross-sectional data. 
 
Table 1: U.S. trade with the rest of the worlda, b 
U.S. imports    U.S. exports   
variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust std 
errors 
 variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust std 
errors 
Importer’s score -0.44 0.60  Importer’s score -0.76** 0.37 
Exporter’s score -0.38 0.28  Exporter’s score 0.65 0.55 
Pseudo R2 0.40   Pseudo R2 0.55  
Note: (a) both partners’ fixed effects and sectors’ fixed effects are included in the regression but omitted in the 
table. (b) ** denotes significance levels of 5%. 
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Next, we turn to the trade performance of Canada, or case (iii) and case (iv) described 
above. Table 2 reports the regression results when we investigate Canadian imports and exports. 
Canada’s MRL stringency weakly reduces its imports from the rest of the world but 
systematically stimulates its exports of plant and animal products to the rest of the world. The 
latter effect is statistically significant, suggesting that Canadian producers might have gained 
further competitiveness after complying with the stringent regulations at home.  
Two rationales justify such export-promoting effect. First, meeting strict regulations at 
home saves Canadian exporters from rejections and refusals at the customs of other nations. 
Second, lower tolerance levels in Canada could enhance Canadian exporters’ reputation in 
foreign markets where food safety pays off in terms of either higher premium or repeated 
purchase.  
The regressions results show that the exporter’s score is positively associated with 
Canadian imports although such positive effect is statistically insignificant. Liu and Yue (2012) 
report a similar export-facilitating effect of catching up in terms of low tolerance levels in the 
destination markets for the case of trade in apples. In their case the effect is statistically 
significant. 
 
Table 2: Canada’ trade with the rest of the worlda, b 
Canadian imports   Canadian exports  
variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust std 
errors 
 variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust std 
errors 
Importer’s score -0.26 0.25  Importer’s score -0.02 0.43 
Exporter’s score 0.05 0.50  Exporter’s score 0.98** 0.48 
Pseudo R2 0.60   Pseudo R2 0.52  
Note: (a) both partners’ fixed effects and sectors’ fixed effects are included in the regression but omitted in the table. 
(b) ** denotes significance levels of 5%. 
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Next we discuss the second set of results using the balanced sample of all 60 countries in 
the pooled regression. Table 3 summarizes the associated econometric results. Qualitatively, the 
implications that are specific to US and Canada, as elaborated below, are similar to those found 
in Table 1 and Table 2. 
 
 
Table 3. Pooled regression with balanced samplea, b 
Bilateral trade flows     
variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust std 
errors 
 variable Estimated 
coefficient 
Robust std 
errors 
Importer’s score -0.29** 0.12  Exporter’s score 0.31*** 0.09 
Importer’s score    Exporter’s score   
⊗to Canada 0.39* 0.22  ⊗from Canada 0.42** 0.16 
Importer’s score    Exporter’s score   
⊗to US -0.16 0.50  ⊗from US 0.13 0.30 
Ln(distance) -1.16*** 0.05  Contiguity 0.30*** 0.11 
Language 0.35*** 0.12  Colonial tie -0.14 0.15 
Pseudo R2 0.47      
F-tests for the trade effects of US and Canadian scores P value  
H0: Importer’s score + importer’s score⊗Canada dummy = 0 0.62  
H0: Importer’s score + importer’s score⊗US dummy = 0 0.38  
H0: Exporter’s score + Exporter’s score⊗Canada dummy = 0 0.00  
H0: Exporter’s score + Exporter’s score⊗US dummy = 0 0.13  
Note: (a) the reference country is Bahamas, which complies with Codex MRLs completely; (b) “Importer’s 
score⊗to Canada” represents the additional slope assigned to the Importer’s score when the destination country is 
Canada; “Exporter’s score⊗from Canada” represents the additional slope assigned to the Exporter’s score when the 
source country is Canada; the interaction terms when US is involved are defined similarly. 
 
Abstracting from the specific implications for Canada and the US, results in Table 3 
show that the MRL stringency in an average importing country tends to affect its imports 
negatively, and that the MRL stringency in an average exporting country influences its exports 
positively. A glance at the U.S.-specific responses suggests that, relative to trade effects of the 
score indices, the US is no different from an average importer or exporter. Statistically, however, 
we fail to reject the hypothesis that the impact of U.S. MRL stringency on its imports (captured 
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by the sum of the common effect and U.S.-specific effect of the importer’s score) is zero. 
Similarly, we accept the hypothesis that the impact of U.S. MRL stringency on its exports 
(captured by the sum of the common effect and the U.S.-specific effect of the exporter’s score) is 
null.7 The above two results concerning the trade effects of the U.S. MRL stringency are 
consistent with the results reported in Table 1 based on the individual regressions. 
Turning to Canada’s specific responses to MRL stringency, we see that Canada’s own 
slope is of opposite sign on an average importer’s stringency variable, and the associated F test 
shows that we cannot reject the hypothesis that the sum of the common effect and the Canada 
specific effects is zero. That is, Canadian MRLs have not affected its imports significantly. On 
the export side, we find that Canada’s own response reinforces the common export-enhancing 
effect found for an average exporter. The hypothesis that the sum of these two effects is equal to 
zero is strongly rejected. To sum up, Canadian exports to the rest of the world expand due to its 
own MRL stringency, but its imports are not significantly hurt by those MRLs. The above results 
are fully consistent with the results of Table 2 based on individual equations. 
The remaining results in Table 3, concerning other trade costs, are in line with what one 
would expect in a gravity equation analysis. The trade-impeding effect of distance is well within 
the range of previous estimates (see Disdier and Head, 2008). Both a common language and a 
shared border facilitate bilateral trade significantly. Former colonial ties do not seem to have a 
significant effect on bilateral flows once the similarity in language is accounted for. 
Diagnostic analysis and robustness checks 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  The different inference one can draw based on T tests and F tests can be explained by the high standard error on 
the US-specific slopes in Table 3.	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We check the robustness of the empirical results with a focus on the first set of regressions.8 First, 
it is a common concern that the Poisson Pseudo Maximum Likelihood (PPML) estimator may 
deliver biased results when trade data exhibit a limited-dependency: the high frequency of zero 
trade flows may be caused by large fixed costs of trade (Martin and Pham, 2008). Therefore, we 
need to check whether equation (2) is correctly specified. To this end, we conduct Ramsey 
specification tests (Ramsey, 1969) for all four regressions in the first set. The tests results 
suggest that we should accept the null hypothesis that equation (2) is correctly specified for case 
(i) through (iii) but reject such null hypothesis for case (iv) at 5 per cent confidence level. Since 
case (iv) is also featured with the highest proportion of zeros (8 per cent), we speculate that the 
misspecification is attributable to the lack of appropriate separate treatment of zeros. With the 
root causes of zeros unknown, we delete all observations with zero trade records and re-estimate 
(2) using the truncated sample. The associated results show that the main finding in case (iv), 
that more stringent Canadian MRLs expand Canada’s exports to the rest of world, is sustained. 
 
Conclusions 
Quality-like standards, such as SPS and TBT measures, can be effective policies tools to correct 
market imperfections, or can create unnecessary trade barriers in disguise. Although the 
distinction of the two cases is difficult to delineate in practice, we use data on MRLs in plant and 
animal products to investigate how stringency of MRLs above international standards impacts 
trade flows between Canada and the US with their respective trading partners. Based on Li and 
Beghin (2012), we use score indices of MRL stringency to measure countries’ strictness in 
MRLs relative to the Codex levels for each product. Canada tends to have more stringent MRLs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 All results in this subsection are available from the authors upon request. 
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than the US does and sets many of these MRLs well above the Codex levels. In contrast, MRLs 
in the US gravitate around Codex values in most plant and animal products. In a gravity equation 
analysis of U.S. and Canadian trade flows with their trading partners in 2010, we find that, as a 
country that does not adopt MRLs systematically stricter than Codex, the US experiences little 
trade distortion either in terms of imports or exports of plant and animal products. On the other 
hand, as a country implementing MRLs more stringent than Codex in several sectors, Canada 
seems to have gained further international competitiveness with its lower tolerance levels in 
pesticides and veterinary drugs. In addition, the US sees its exports adversely affected by strict 
MRLs adopted by its trading partners. 
We contribute to the analysis of non-tariff trade barriers by underscoring the importance 
of comparing the unilateral standards with the international standards. We also point out the role 
of quality-like standards in promoting international competiveness (or export performance) for 
the domestic industry, which complements the conventional analysis of protectionism (or import 
performance). Extensions could incorporate welfare implications of these findings.  
Policy implications are immediate for the further integration of U.S. and Canadian food 
markets. With respect to the potential harmonization in non-tariff measures between the US and 
Canada, the results suggest that Canada may be reluctant to “harmonize downward” by relaxing 
its stringency to U.S. or Codex levels as mercantilist interests would oppose the loss of 
international competitiveness.  On the other hand, the US has little incentive to “harmonize 
upward” and conform to the Canadian MRLs because setting standards systematically above 
Codex might unnecessarily compromise the domestic industry’s competitiveness and risk losing 
the reputation of a free trader in the world market. 
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